Surveys of Recent Developments in Third Circuit Law
In this survey section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents surveys of recent Third Circuit cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing the Law Review hopes to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of interesting
changes in significant areas of practice.
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-

United States v. Vitale, 159 F.3d 810 (3d

Cir. 1998).
Francis X. Vitale acquired and restored antique clocks to display
in his museum-like gallery in Spring Lake, New Jersey. See United
States v. Vitale, 159 F.3d 810, 812 (3d Cir. 1998). In addition to restoring clocks, Vitale was employed for more than thirteen years by
Engelhard Corporation, a manufacturer of specialty chemical and
metal products. As vice president of strategic development and corporate affairs, Vitale controlled multi-million dollar budgets and possessed authority to approve more than a million dollars for international marketing expenditures. While employed by Engelhard, Vitale
sent fabricated invoices to the cash-management office. The office
then received authorization to wire money to the vendors listed on
the invoice. These vendors were not part of the specialty chemical
and metal products trade, but, rather, were antique clock dealers
from whom Vitale purchased merchandise for his gallery. In addition to fabricating the invoices, Vitale convinced Dimensional Marketing, Inc. to wire funds and send checks to vendors under the pretense that Engelhard was experiencing budgeting problems. In
reality, however, these payments went to clock vendors. Moreover,
Vitale failed to report the embezzled money on his income tax returns.
Upon discovering the criminal activity, Engelhard confronted
Vitale. Vitale confessed to the crimes and made full restitution by

selling his clock collection. In addition to cooperating with Engelhard, Vitale

volunteered

with the Boys & Girls Club of Tren-

ton/Mercer Counties in 1997. Furthermore, Vitale participated in
psychiatric counseling. Vitale's treating physician, Dr. Ventano, determined that Vitale's obsession with antique clocks, "not greed or

accumulation of wealth," motivated his criminal activities. The doctor believed that this obsession dominated Vitale's ability to distinguish between right and wrong and rendered him unable to control
his own actions.
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Subsequently, Vitale was charged with wire fraud and tax evasion
based upon his embezzlement of roughly $12 million from Engelhard. See id. at 812-13. On September 30, 1997, he pleaded guilty to
one count of each charge, pursuant to a plea agreement. See id. at
812. On the wire fraud count, Vitale was charged with causing an illegal wire transfer of $407,223.80 from Engelhard's account to a
clock dealer in Switzerland. On the tax evasion count, Vitale was
charged with failing to pay more than $1.2 million in income tax
based upon a taxable income of more than $3.7 million.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied Vitale's argument that his wire fraud and tax evasion counts
should be grouped for sentencing purposes. See id. Accordingly, the
court determined Vitale's sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines' (U.S.S.G.) multiple-count rules by increasing Vitale's
greater adjusted offense level of twenty-five for the wire fraud count
by two levels and deducting three levels for acceptance of responsibility, for a total offense level of twenty-four. See id. The court indicated
that this level, coupled with Vitale's Criminal History Category of I,
produced a sentence in the range of fifty-one to sixty-three months in
jail. See id. Furthermore, the court refused Vitale's downward departure requests for alleged government manipulation of the charging
documents and for his alleged diminished mental capacity. See id. at
812-13. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (1998), however, the court accepted Vitale's motion for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines based upon his acceptance of responsibility, efforts at
restitution, community service, and rehabilitation following the offense. See id. at 813. The court ultimately sentenced Vitale to "thirty
months in prison (concurrent on counts one and two), two years of
supervised release (also concurrent on counts one and two), and 500
community service hours." Id.
In an opinion by Judge Sloviter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of
conviction and sentence. See id. at 816. First, noting its deference to
the district court's grouping decision, the appellate court reviewed
the factual findings for clear error and exercised plenary review over
the court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines to affirm the
impropriety of grouping the counts of tax evasion and wire fraud. See
id. at 813. Second, the appellate court noted that, absent any legal
error, it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the district court
properly exercised its discretion when refusing a motion for downward departure based on an alleged manipulation of charging
documents. See id. at 816. Finally, the appellate court determined
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that it also lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's refusal to
grant a motion for downward departure based on alleged diminished
mental capacity when the lower court did not misinterpret its authority, nor did it commit an error of law. See id.
Rejecting Vitale's statutory grouping argument, the court held
that wire fraud did not "'embod[y] conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic of the tax evasion count' thus requiring
grouping under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 813 (quoting
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 (1998), which states that "[a]ll counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single
Group"). The court explained that the Sentencing Commission classified the failure to report criminally derived income as a specific offense characteristic of tax evasion only to deter the concealment of
such income. See id. (citing United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052,
1057 (3d Cir. 1991)). Using the classification as a basis for grouping,
the court elaborated, would eliminate this deterrent effect. See id.
The court further reasoned that grouping was not necessary because
(1) Vitale pled guilty to both counts and each count involved different victims, different harms, and different conduct; and (2) tax evasion constituted criminal conduct beyond that included in the fraud
count. See id. at 813-14. The court, therefore, concluded that the
counts were not so closely related that grouping was required. See id.
at 814.
When considering the policies underlying the Sentencing
Guidelines, the court reiterated the conclusion that evading taxes
constituted significant additional criminal conduct beyond wire
fraud. See id. at 815. Although recognizing the Sentencing Commission's goal of preventing multiple punishments for the same crime,
the court professed a fear that unreasonable application of the
grouping portion of the guidelines would leave certain crimes unpunished. See id. Thus, the court deemed the offenses of tax evasion
and wire fraud as patently unrelated and refused to group them together for sentencing purposes. See id.
The court also rejected Vitale's argument that the counts should
be grouped as charges of embezzlement and tax evasion. See id. at
814. Vitale contended that the propriety of grouping these two
counts was left open in United States v. Lieberman. See id. (citing United
States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992)). See id. Noting that
Vitale was never charged with embezzlement, the court quickly rebuffed Lieberman as inapposite. See id.
The court denounced Vitale's textual argument, as well. See id.
at 815. The court recognized that such an argument would require
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interpreting "'conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of
the counts,"' as any adjustment made to an offense level. Id. at 814
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c)). Considering the practical consequences of the two-level enhancement in the tax evasion count, the
court observed that the adjustment had no effect upon the ultimate
sentence. See id. The court explained that such an insignificant adjustment did not rise to the level of the "adjustment" referred to in
the Sentencing Guidelines.
See id. at 815 (citing U.S.S.G. §
3D1.2(c)). Moreover, the court emphasized this point by declining
to apply the Fifth Circuit reasoning that would allow a grouping even
where the tax evasion enhancement does not effect the ultimate offense level. See id. (citing United States v. Haltom, 113 F.3d 43 (5th Cir.
1997)). Accordingly, the court rejected the textual argument. See id.
After rejecting Vitale's grouping arguments, the appellate court
considered the denial of his motion for downward departure based
on alleged governmental manipulation of the charging documents
and diminished capacity. See id. at 816. Although recognizing that
the district court maintains the authority to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines when grouping is unavailable, the appellate court
stated that departure in such circumstances is not required. See id.
According to the majority, the lower court understood its power to
depart, but simply chose not to exercise it. See id. The appellate
court, therefore, announced that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
refusal of downward departure for manipulation of the charging
documents because the lower court had not committed any legal error. See id.
Finally, the court noted Vitale's argument that the lower court
failed to acknowledge its power to grant a downward departure based
on diminished capacity. See id. Reviewing the refusal for abuse of
discretion, however, the appellate court noted that the district court
considered prior case law, as well as the facts at bar. See id. Thus,
finding no misinterpretation of authority and no error of law, the
appellate court once again submitted to its lack ofjurisdiction. See id.
Senior District Judge Fullam concurred in the judgment, but
opined that the majority's reasoning and elaboration were faulty. See
id. at 817 (Fullam, J., concurring). Judge Fullam declared that
grouping was required under the circumstances because the criminal
conduct in mail fraud was a specific offense characteristic of the tax
charge. See id. The judge disagreed with the majority that the grouping would undermine the goal of preventing concealment of criminal income by eliminating the heavier punishment placed on tax eva-
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sion. See id. According to Judge Fullam, the goal appeared to be undermined here only because the tax evasion count carried a lesser
sentence. See id. Judge Fullam clarified that if the tax count, rather
than the fraud count, had carried a higher guideline range, then the
two-level enhancement would have been significant under the majority analysis. See id. Therefore, Judge Fullam advocated the use of a
bright-line test to determine whether counts should be grouped for
sentencing purposes. See id. Despite this analytical disagreement,
Judge Fullam conceded to the binding precedent set by the panel
opinion in United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1991).
Unlike Judge Fullam, the Vitale majority looked at the practical
effect that grouping would have on the underlying goals of the Sentencing Guidelines. By grouping the tax evasion count into the wire
fraud count, the deterrent effect would be lost under these circumstances. Concededly, Judge Fullam states correctly that the deterrence element would not be lost if the fraud count were higher, but
in the present case, fraud was the lower count. Therefore, the appellate court was correct in holding that the element of deterrence
would be lost with grouping. Moreover, even if the wire fraud count
were higher, the crime of tax evasion would still be left unpunished if
the counts in the present case were grouped because that count
would be lost within the wire fraud sentence. The Sentencing Guidelines were meant to simplify multiple count sentencing, not to eliminate punishment for some of the crimes.
Judge Fullam also suggested the use of a bright-line test that
would always group tax evasion with the conduct producing the income. The case at bar, however, presented a situation that precluded
the use of such a convenient test. As indicated, by automatically
grouping tax evasion with the activity producing the income, the
criminal tax evasion would be left unpunished in certain situations.
Such a result would be an unreasonable way to interpret the Sentencing Guidelines.
Vitale pleaded guilty to the separate counts of wire fraud and tax
evasion. Each of these activities harmed different people during different transactions. Therefore, each count should be punished individually. Moreover, Vitale was granted downward departures for restitution paid, accepting responsibility, and community service.
Therefore,justice dictates that Vitale should serve the remaining sentence for each of the crimes to which he pled guilty. Defendants
cannot be permitted to use grouping simply as a means to lower sentences. This mechanism prevents defendants from receiving multiple
punishments for the same crimes or activities, but when the crimes
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are unrelated, it should not create a technical loophole to reduce
sentences. Fortunately, the majority mended this loophole before
Vitale successfully squirmed through it.
Taryn Leigh Decker

INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
HANDICAPPED PERSONS NON-ATORNEY PARENTS HAVE No RIGHT TO
EDUCATION ACT REPRESENT THEIR CHILD IN AN ATION UNDER THE IDEA BECAUSE
THE ACT DOES NOT CREATE JOINT RIGHTS IN THE PARENT AND CHILD

Collinsgru v. PalmyraBd. of Educ., No. 96-5807, 1998 WL 806416, at
*1 (3d Cir. Nov. 23, 1998).

-

Robert and Maura Collinsgru (the Collinsgrus) and their son
Francis lived in Palmyra, New Jersey where Francis attended the
Palmyra Public Schools. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., No. 965807, 1998 WL 806416, at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 23, 1998). The Collinsgrus believed that Francis had a learning disability and that he required an education that would accommodate his special needs.
Contrary to the Collinsgrus's belief, the School Board's Child Study
Team determined that Francis was not eligible for special education
accommodations.
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
the Collinsgrus sought administrative relief. See id. (citing 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1491 (1994 & Supp. 1997)). The Collinsgrus presented their
case to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) without representation
from legal counsel, as expressly permitted in the IDEA. See id. (citing
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (h)(1)). After a nineteen-day hearing, the ALJ decided that Francis's learning disabilities were not severe enough to
entide him to special education services. See id.
Subsequently, the Collinsgrus continued the matter pro se and
filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey. See id. at *2. The Collinsgrus's complaint initially alleged the following: (1) The Palmyra School Board (Board) conducted an inadequate evaluation of Francis; (2) The Board interfered in the evaluation; (3) The ALJ "manufactured" testimony; and
(4) The ALJ's ruling was tainted by the state Commissioner of Education's opinion that far too many children were "being labeled as
learning disabled." See id. In response, the Board filed its answer as
well as an objection to the Collinsgrus's decision to represent Francis
pro se. See id. The Collinsgrus then amended the complaint to state
that they were asserting both their parental rights and their son's
rights in accordance with the IDEA. See id. Although the Collinsgrus
would have preferred legal representation, they recognized that they

1170

SURVEYS

1171

did not qualify for appointment of counsel under the in forma pauperis statute. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994)). Further, due to
the serious nature of the case, the Collinsgrus could not afford representation nor could they obtain counsel on a contingent fee or pro
bono basis. See id.
The district court ruled that the Collinsgrus could not represent
Francis pro se in the civil suit. See id. The district court further rejected the Collinsgrus's assertion that the challenge to the ALJ's ruling was premised upon their rights as parents. See id. The court
thereby held that Francis was the party and that an attorney must
represent him. See id. The Collinsgrus were given thirty days to retain counsel for Francis and upon their failure to do so, the District
Court dismissed Francis's claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41 (b) for failure to prosecute. See id. The Collinsgrus petitioned the district court to certify an interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b), but the court denied the petition. See id. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994)). The district court, however, advised the
Collinsgrus to seek interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the
collateral order exception. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994)).
The Collinsgrus subsequently filed a motion asking the district court
to clarify those claims that they could commence as parents and
those that only Francis could commence. See id. To avoid proffering
an advisory opinion, the district court declined to answer. See id.
The Collinsgrus then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. See id. at *3. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, thereby holding that Congress
did not intend the IDEA to "create joint rights in parents." Id. at *13.
Thus, the court held that non-attorney parents may not represent
their children in federal court under the IDEA. See id.
Judge Becker, writing for the majority, commenced the analysis
by determining the jurisdictional issues. See id. at *3. The court explained that its jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 exists only if the appeal meets the collateral order exception to the finality requirement of § 1291. See id. The majority
first considered whether the issue of parents representing their children under the IDEA could be reviewed under the collateral order
exception. See id.
In analyzing whether the issue met the requirements of the collateral order exception, the court utilized the collateral order exception test established in In re Ford Motor Co. See id. (citing In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954 (3d Cir. 1997)). See id. The court stated that an
appellant could appeal a non-final order if the order: (1) conclu-
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sively determines the question disputed; (2) resolves an important issue distinctly separate from underlying dispute; and (3) is unreviewable by an appellate court from a finaljudgment. Id.
The majority quickly disposed of the first prong by stating that
the district court order denying the Collinsgrus the right to represent
their son pro se in an IDEA action in federal court eliminated any
further opportunity for the Collinsgrus to dispute the issue of representation. See id. The majority then determined that the appeal satisfied the second prong. See id. The court concluded that the issue of
whether the Collinsgrus could represent their son was separate from
the underlying issue - whether Francis was improperly denied special education services under the IDEA. See id. The court further
noted that in satisfying the second prong it was necessary "to examine the importance of the issue to be reviewed." Id. at *4. The court
stated that "we must balance the importance of the Collinsgrus's
right to represent their son in these proceedings with our interests in
finality and in avoiding piecemeal appeals." Id. The court recognized that the resolution of the Collinsgrus's question was necessary
to adjudicate their claims in district court. See id. Further, Judge
Becker acknowledged that parents' rights to represent their children
under the IDEA were crucial to the functioning of the IDEA. See id.
Accordingly, the majority determined that the Collinsgrus's interests
outweighed the court's interest in finality. See id.
In resolving the third prong of the test, the court recognized the
Supreme Court's restrictions on interlocutory appeals regarding issues of legal representation. See id. The court, however, aligned with
the Eleventh Circuit, which distinguishes between those appeals regarding legal representation and those regarding pro se representation. See id. Judge Becker emphasized the importance of an individual's right to appear pro se and acknowledged that by denying a
party the right to appear pro se, the court may create an irreparable
injury. See id. The majority additionally maintained that the denial
of the right to appear pro se was the same as a denial of the right to
proceed in forma pauperis, a question which is immediately appealable. See id. at *5. Further, the court stated that "these orders effectively close the courthouse door to litigants, [because] the majority of
courts to consider the issue have held that orders denying leave to
proceed pro se are immediately appealable." Id.
In finding that the question of whether a parent could represent
his child following an administrative procedure under the IDEA satisfied the collateral order exception requirements, the court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the Collinsgrus's appeal. See id.
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The court articulated that in reviewing a district court's dismissal for
failure to prosecute, the court would utilize an abuse of discretion
standard. See id. Because the order was premised upon the statutory
construction of the IDEA, however, the court stated that plenary review was the appropriate standard. See id.
Judge Becker proceeded to address the right to proceed pro se
and, first, noted that a party has the right to proceed on his own behalf in federal court. See id. The court contrasted this right to Rule
17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that minors
do not have the same right to represent themselves in a legal action.
See id. The majority indicated that in accordance with Rule 17(c), "'a
representative or guardian may sue or defend on behalf of the infant."' Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)). The court noted, however,
that the Third Circuit would follow its well-established precedent that
"the right to proceed pro se in federal court does not give non-lawyer
parents the right to represent their children in proceedings before a
federal court." Id. (citing Osei-Afriyee v. Medical College of Pennsylvania,
937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1991)). In support of this view, the majority
noted its decision in Osei-Afriyee, in which the court vacated a district
court judgment because a non-attorney parent had represented his
children in a tort action. See id. at *6. Judge Becker stated that the
court in Osei-Afriyee held that the non-attorney parent's lack of experience and legal training resulted in the statute of limitations tolling
on a tort claim. See id. (citing Osei-Afriyee, 937 F.2d at 882). The majority further noted that the Osei-Afriyee court held that the children
could wait until they reached the age of majority and proceed pro se,
but their non-attorney parent could not represent them in federal
court. See id. (citing Osei-Afriyee, 937 F.2d at 883).
Judge Becker asserted two important policy considerations underlying the court's ruling as to the Collinsgrus. See id. First, the
strong state interest in regulating the practice of law protects the represented party by ensuring a minimal level of competence and protects his opponents and the court from "poorly drafted, inarticulate,
or vexatious claims." Id. Second, the court recognized that a licensed attorney will be more skilled in the practice of law and, further, will be subject to malpractice and professional rules of conduct
to which a non-attorney is not exposed. See id.
In addition to the policy considerations, the court declined to
recognize a right of parents to represent their children in light of
congressional intent and common law. See id. First, the majority
honored the well-established presumption that unless Congress indicates the contrary, common law principles will apply to achieve the
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statutory purpose. See id. The court, failing to find any statutory language in the IDEA that provided non-attorney parents with a right to
represent their children, noted "that a non-lawyer may not represent
another person in court is a venerable common law rule." Id. at *7.
Finally, the court utilized the canon of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius,which reflects the notion that an express provision in a statute indicates congressional intent to exclude similar provisions not
specifically mentioned in the statute. See id. Thus, the majority rejected the right of a parent to represent his child in federal court. See
id. The majority concluded that, in the IDEA, Congress explicitly
provided that parents could represent their children in the administrative proceedings; however, the statute did not provide for representation in federal court. See id. The majority determined that
Congress intended to permit parental representation only in the administrative proceedings. See id.
The majority then addressed the Collinsgrus's argument that
because the IDEA claim involves the education of their son, and because the Collinsgrus, as parents, are responsible for their son's education, they are the true parties to the case and, thus, they should be
able to proceed pro se. See id. at *8. The court looked to the congressional intent of the IDEA to resolve the Collinsgrus's contention
that the IDEA provided the "authority for them to represent not only
their own rights and interests, but also, albeit indirectly, those of
their son in proceedings before the district court." Id.
In interpreting the IDEA, the court indicated that it would interpret that statute by looking at its plain language. See id. at *9. Further, the court noted, if the language was ambiguous, the court
would analyze its legislative history with the ultimate goal of ascertaining the congressional intent of the IDEA. See id. In reviewing the
plain language of the IDEA, the court acknowledged that the statute
expressly provided parents with (1) the right to represent their children in the administrative proceedings and (2) a right of action to
bring a civil suit in federal court following the administrative proceedings. See id. at *8. The majority carefully analyzed four areas of
the IDEA that the Collinsgrus argued created a joint right of action.
See id. at *10. The court noted that the four sections of the IDEA
provided parents with the right to attorney fees and included language mentioning rights of handicapped children and their parents
under the IDEA. See id. Although the language may suggest that
Congress intended that parents and children would share the same
substantive rights under the IDEA, the court concluded that it could
also be interpreted that parents did not share in those same rights.
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See id. at *11. Therefore, the majority determined that the plain language of the statute was ambiguous, thus forcing the court to look to
the legislative history of the IDEA- See id.
The majority next noted that the legislative history also did not
indicate a congressional intent to create joint fights in parents. See
id. The court found brief comments in the legislative history that
suggested that the parents had procedural rights to represent the interests of the child, but that the substantive rights under the IDEA belonged only to the child. See id. Because the legislative history offered no further indications of a joint right in the parent, the
majority determined that Congress did not intend "parents to have
joint rights with their children under the IDEA." Id. at *12.
The Third Circuit particularly referred to the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion, which stated that absent such congressional intent, the
court would rule that non-attorney parents may not represent their
child pro se. See id. (citing Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121
F.3d 576, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1997)). The court further noted that the
Eleventh Circuit would proceed in that manner because "'it helps to
ensure that children rightfully entitled to legal relief are not deprived
of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents."' Id. (quoting
Devine, 121 F.3d at 582).
Finally, the majority examined policy arguments presented by
the Collinsgrus. See id. The court agreed with the Collinsgrus that
often parents are the only advocates for a child's right because many
attorneys are reluctant to accept this type of case without a large retainer. See id. The majority noted, however, that based upon its
analysis and the fact that Congress provided for attorney fees in the
IDEA, parents cannot represent their children in IDEA actions in
federal court. See id. The majority also rejected the argument that
the IDEA commingles the rights of parents and their children such
that the parents have an interest in every IDEA claim commenced.
See id. at *13. In rejecting this argument, the majority acknowledged
that a disabled child with no parents could commence an IDEA claim
and that a parent has no rights under the IDEA without a disabled
child. See id. Therefore, the court stated that "the rights at issue here
are divisible, and not concurrent." Id.
Judge Roth concurred in the majority's conclusion that the
IDEA issue was immediately appealable under the collateral order
exception. See id. (Roth, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Roth
dissented, however, from the majority's conclusion that the Collinsgrus did not possess joint rights with their child under the IDEA and
consequently could not proceed pro se in federal court. See id.
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Judge Roth asserted that the rights of parents and children are
"overlapping and inseparable" and that, because of the parents' responsibility to support their children's education rights, parents are
real parties and should be entitled to pursue both their interests and
their child's interests. See id.
In analyzing the purpose of the IDEA, Judge Roth noted that the
IDEA was enacted to ensure appropriate education services for learning-disabled children and that parents play an "integral role.., in effectuating [the] educational goals." Id. at *14 (Roth, J., concurring
and dissenting). The judge opined that establishing joint rights
would support the purpose of the IDEA. See id. In support of this
view, Judge Roth first looked to the IDEA's procedural safeguards.
See id. The judge declared that the IDEA provides parents with (1)
the right to be involved in the evaluation process by providing access
to all relevant records from the education agency; (2) the right to independent evaluations; and (3) an opportunity to file complaints on
any matter related to the evaluation or educational placement of the
child. See id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(1)(A) & (C)). Judge Roth
observed that this protection indicates a congressional intent to have
parents "play an active and informed role in the evaluation and education of their children." Id. The judge also noted that the IDEA allows for administrative proceedings during which parents can act as
advocates for their children and the right to bring an action in federal court based on the decisions in the administrative proceeding.
See id. at *15 (Roth,J., concurring and dissenting).
Although the statute does not expressly state the role of parents
in IDEA actions in federal court, Judge Roth interpreted the IDEA to
"reflect[ ] the practical recognition that parents are the persons who
are vested with the authority and the obligation to oversee their
child's education and to enforce their child's rights under the
[IDEA]." Id. Further dissenting, the judge asserted that although
the IDEA does not expressly provide pro se rights, the legislative intent indicates that parental involvement is not to be limited to administrative proceedings where pro se rights are explicit. See id. at *16
(Roth, J., concurring and dissenting). The judge stated that, absent
clear congressional intent, it was incomprehensible that parents who
have rights during administrative proceedings do not have the right
to challenge the decisions of the proceedings. See id.
Judge Roth also referenced the IDEA's fee-shifting provisions
that provide attorney fees to parents. See id. In analyzing the legislative history of these provisions, Judge Roth noted that "'Congress'
original intent was that due process procedures, including the right
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to litigation if that becomes necessary be available to all parents."' Id.
(quoting Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, S. Rep.
No. 99-112, at 2, reprinted at, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799). Further
quoting from the Senate Committee Report, Judge Roth stated that
"'the parents or legal representative of handicapped children must
be able to access the full range of available remedies in order to protect their handicapped children's educational rights."' Id. (quoting
S. Rep. No. 99-112 at 17, reprintedat 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1806). The
judge also agreed with the Collinsgrus's argument that the feeshifting provisions were deficient because they were unable to retain
counsel and thus were left only with the option to appeal the administrative order pro se. See id.
Finally, Judge Roth rejected the majority's reliance on OseiAfriyee, stating that the nature of a tort claim is significantly different
from that of an IDEA claim. See id. at *17 (Roth, J., concurring and
dissenting). The judge found that an IDEA appeal, if not disposed of
in a timely fashion, could have serious consequences whereas a tort
claim commenced by a minor is tolled until the minor reaches the
age of majority. See id. Judge Roth concluded that because the procedural safeguards in the IDEA preserve parents' responsibility in the
education of their child and the special responsibility parents have in
enforcing their child's educational rights, the IDEA creates a joint
right shared by parents and their children. See id. at *16 (Roth, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
The majority's analysis of the common law, the statutory language, legislative history, Third Circuit precedent, and policy considerations strongly supports its conclusion that non-attorney parents
may not represent their children in federal court and that the IDEA
does not create a joint right in parents. Although the majority position is well supported, the opinion is perhaps more functional in
theory than in reality. Parents of disabled children possess a significant burden, both emotionally and financially, in providing an adequate quality of life for their children. The majority's opinion works
well in theory when a parent can afford to retain an attorney to appeal an administrative proceeding. When parents cannot afford legal
representation or to retain counsel in forma pauperis, or on a pro
bono basis, and cannot represent their child pro se, the IDEA is rendered useless and can no longer support its goal of providing disabled children with their right to special education services.
RichardP. DiegnanJr.

CRIMINAL LAW -

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION - AN OVERTURNED
MUNICIPAL COURT CONVICTION DOES NOT PREVENT A PLAINTIFF
FROM SUING A POLICE OFFICER IN A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION ACTION Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120 (3d

Cir. 1998).
Officer Jeffrey De Simone arrested defendant-appellant, Rosemary Montgomery on September 30, 1992, for speeding, drunk driving, and refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test. See Montgomery v.
De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1998). At Montgomery's municipal trial, Officer De Simone testified that Montgomery was speeding based on a radar reading and his own observation. De Simone
further testified that, after Montgomery failed several sobriety tests,
he directed her to drive to a vacant lot across the street and wait
while he attended to a second car that had asked for directions. De
Simone's testimony indicated that he subsequently took Montgomery
to the police station and there informed her for the first time that
she was under arrest.
Montgomery's testimony, however, painted a considerably different picture of events. Her testimony stated that she merely had
one Irish coffee before driving, she was not speeding, and she did not
fail any sobriety tests. See id. at 122-23. Furthermore, Montgomery
contended that De Simone ordered her to drive to an empty parking
lot across the street, where the officer pulled up behind her five to
ten minutes later with his overhead lights off. See id. at 123. Montgomery claimed that De Simone's demeanor changed and that he
asked her if she liked police officers and ever dated them. Montgomery testified that after she tried to change the subject, De Simone
offered to give her a ride to the station where she could make a telephone call.
In the criminal suit against Montgomery, the municipal judge
held that there was probable cause for De Simone to make the stop
and the arrest based solely on De Simone's testimony. Furthermore,
the municipal judge found Montgomery guilty of speeding, drunk
driving, and refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test. Montgomery
appealed and a trial de novo was held on February 4, 1994, in the
Superior Court of New Jersey. The superior court reversed Mont-
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gomery's convictions and entered verdicts of not guilty on all
charges.
Montgomery filed a complaint on February 1, 1995, in the
United States District Court for the District of NewJersey alleging (1)
a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, (2) § 1983 false imprisonment and false arrest claims, and (3) § 1983 claims against the police
department and the township based on De Simone's actions. See id.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer De
Simone as to Montgomery's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim because the municipal court had reasonably concluded that probable
cause existed for Montgomery's arrest. See id. The court also held
that the § 1983 false imprisonment and false arrest claims were time
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See id. Lastly, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality on the
§ 1983 claims because of a lack of evidence to raise a genuine issue of
material fact. See id. Subsequently, Montgomery timely filed an appeal. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, examining the record de novo, reversed in part and affirmed in part. See
id. at 122. The appellate court reversed the order granting summary
judgment of the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Officer
De Simone, holding that an overturned municipal court conviction
does not decisively establish probable cause for purposes of a § 1983
malicious prosecution claim. See id. The court, therefore, remanded
the case, finding that Montgomery did raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning probable cause. See id. Finally, the court affirmed the orders granting summary judgment of the § 1983 false
imprisonment and false arrest claims and the § 1983 claims against
the municipal defendants. See id.
Writing for the majority, Judge Mansmann initially explained
that in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution
Montgomery must prove, among other things, "an absence of probable cause for the initiation of the proceedings against her." Id. at
124. The judge noted that the issue of probable cause in a § 1983
claim is usually one for the jury. See id. In examining the appropriateness of summary judgment, the court articulated that it must examine Montgomery's evidence concerning probable cause and, after
applying any necessary presumptions, determine whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether De Simone had probable
cause to stop and arrest Montgomery. See id.
Next, the court scrutinized the common-law rule that a conviction presumptively proves the existence of probable cause unless the
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conviction was attained,:through perjury, fraud, or corruption. See id.
While exploring the origin of the presumption from the Restatement
of Torts, Judge Mansmann recognized that the presumption was developed in cases against private citizens, not cases against police officers. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 667(1) (1977)).
Furthermore, the judge noted that not all state courts observe this
rule and that the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether common-law rules apply to § 1983 claims. See id. After considering the
Supreme Court's approach involving the application of common-law
rules to § 1983 actions, the Third Circuit concluded that it is necessary to examine the "'policies that [the common-law rule] serves and
its compatibility with the purpose of § 1983."' Id. at 124-25 (quoting
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259 (1981)).
The majority continued its discussion of the common-law presumption by rejecting a Second Circuit decision in Cameron v. Fogarty
that applied the presumption to a § 1983 claim. See id. at 125 (citing
Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1986)). The judge reiterated the Third Circuit's holding in Rose v. Bartle, in which the court
expressly criticized Cameron's policy considerations. See id. (citing
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989)). Judge Mansmann concluded that the common-law presumption that an overturned municipal conviction establishes probable cause conflicts with the policies of the Civil Rights Act (Act) and, thus, does not apply to a
malicious prosecution action under § 1983. See id.
The court buttressed this holding by examining the purpose of
the Civil Rights Act. See id. Judge Mansmann articulated that the aim
of the Act is to safeguard citizens from the abuse of power by state actors. See id. The Act accomplishes this, the judge explained, by interposing the federal courts between the people and the states. See
id. (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)). The judge
quoted the Supreme Court's language in Mitchum explaining the
purpose of the Act: "' [Congress] realized that state [courts] might,
in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of [federally created]
rights."' Id. (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242). Accordingly, Judge
Mansmann held that the common-law presumption undermines a
central purpose of the Act - to interject the federal courts, as protectors of federal rights, between the people and the sovereignty of
the states. See id.
Examining the evidence without the common-law presumption,
the court concluded that Montgomery raised a genuine issue of material fact, based on her testimony, as to whether probable cause existed for De Simone's stop and arrest. See id. at 125-26. Therefore,
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Judge Mansmann reversed the grant of summary judgment on Montgomery's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. See id. at 126.
The majority next addressed the two-year limitations period applicable to the § 1983 false imprisonment and false arrest claims. See
id. The judge acknowledged that both parties agreed that the twoyear period is applicable. See id. Judge Mansmann stated that the issue, however, is when the period began to run. See id. To resolve this
question the judge instructed that under federal law the period begins to run when the plaintiff "'knows or has reason to know of the
injury which is the basis of the § 1983 action."' Id. (quoting Genty v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991)). The majority observed that a false arrest claim covers damages only for the time
period of detention. See id. Additionally, the court explained that a
claim for false imprisonment relates only to Montgomery's arrest and
the few hours immediately following her arrest. See id. The court
concluded that Montgomery reasonably knew of her injuries on the
night De Simone arrested her and, therefore, the two-year limitation
period for the § 1983 false imprisonment and false arrest claims began to run on that night. See id. Thus, the judge held that the district court was correct in dismissing these two claims due to the running of the statute of limitations. See id.
Finally, Judge Mansmann reviewed Montgomery's claim that the
municipality was liable under § 1983 for De Simone's conduct. See id.
The judge held that municipal defendants may be liable under
§ 1983 only when an official custom or policy resulted in a constitutional deprivation. See id. (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978)). The court elaborated that
a constitutional violation results only when a municipality's failure to
instruct police officers rises to the level of deliberate indifference. See
id. at 126-27. The judge noted that Montgomery's claims against the
municipality that she was harassed and unlawfully detained by De Simone rest on proving the municipality's failure properly to train,
control, or discipline its officers. See id. at 127. The majority, therefore, affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on
these claims, concluding that since Montgomery did not point to any
inadequacy of the police training program, and since she did not
demonstrate that the municipality encouraged De Simone's actions,
her claims under § 1983 against the municipality must fail. See id.
Judge Roth agreed with the majority's decision to affirm the
dismissal of Montgomery's false imprisonment, false arrest, and municipality claims, but dissented from the majority's decision to reject
the common-law/Restatement of Torts presumption regarding prob-
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able cause. See id. at 127 (Roth,J., concurring and dissenting). More
specifically, the judge maintained that a conviction should, even if ultimately overturned, presumptively establish probable cause to initiate the original prosecution in the context of a § 1983 claim. See id.
Furthermore, the judge stipulated that this common-law rebuttable
presumption does not offend the purposes of § 1983. See id.
Judge Roth first recounted that the superior court judge reversed Montgomery's convictions because the evidence could not
prove Montgomery's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 128
(Roth, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Roth explained that the
superior court found, in part, that the radar evidence of speeding was
inadmissible. See id. The judge speculated that if a failure to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could nullify a finding of probable
cause, every successful appeal would provoke a malicious prosecution
claim. See id. Further, Judge Roth urged that inadmissibility of evidence should have no bearing on whether Montgomery's prosecution was reasonable in the first place. See id. Consequently, the judge
opined that the municipal court's finding of probable cause to commence the proceeding should not be dislodged because of a reversal
based on insufficient evidence. See id. Judge Roth supported this argument by explaining that a reversal for insufficient evidence is not
identical to a ruling that the conviction was produced corruptly or
fraudulently. See id.
Turning to the Second Circuit case Cameron v. Fogarty, Judge
Roth noted that the majority, following precedent set in Rose v. Bartle,
questioned Cameron's holding as not reflecting the "proper accommodation" between societal and individual interests. See id. (citations
omitted). Judge Roth distinguished both Rose and Cameron, however,
in that they involved claims for false arrest. See id. The judge stressed
that a false arrest claim depends on whether there has been an illegal
arrest, whereas a malicious prosecution claim depends on the propriety of the proceeding itself being commenced with probable
cause. See id. at 128-29 (Roth, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge
Roth thus opined that the concerns in Rose do not carry over to the
present case. See id. at 129 (Roth,J., concurring and dissenting).
The judge refuted the majority's notion that a municipal conviction would "wipe out" a § 1983 claim by noting that the common-law
rule merely raises a rebuttable presumption. See id. Judge Roth concluded by stating that the presumption may be rebutted by showing
that the conviction was established through coercion or fraud, both
of which are behaviors that § 1983 seeks to guard against. See id.
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The majority's concern that the common-law presumption infringes upon the purposes of the Civil Rights Act is understandable
and, given that the trial de novo reversed Montgomery's convictions,
this holding appears reasonable. The Civil Rights Act is undoubtedly
necessary to protect individuals from state actors' misuse of power.
See id. at 125. One could make a good argument, however, that this
court went beyond its jurisdiction by interposing itself between
Montgomery and the state court system. The state court system operates under the same basic tenets as the federal court system, those
of honesty, integrity, and justice. The Third Circuit's decision to negate the municipal court's finding of probable cause, however, seems
to undermine the municipal court system and to imply that the municipal court may not have acted with impartiality. Furthermore, the
majority's holding that a reversed conviction eliminates the municipal judge's finding of probable cause for purposes of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is illogical because if only the conviction is
reversed, the municipal judge's factual finding of probable cause
should still be relevant.
Application of the common-law presumption of probable cause
would have been the better result in this case. As Judge Roth observed, this result will not encourage every defendant who has a successful appeal to pursue a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Additionally, the common-law presumption does not threaten the
purposes of the Civil Rights Act. Rather, it accords proper strength
to the municipal court, and it is a rebuttable presumption that may
be overcome by evidence that the prosecutor did, in fact, lack probable cause.
WalterJ.Dorgan III

FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS - SEARCH AND SEIZURES
- LAw ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' CONDUCT DURING A CIVIL EVICTION
IS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE WHEN THEY AGGRESSIVELY ENTER
PREMISES WITH REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERSONS TO BE
REMOVED MIGHT POSE A THREAT TO THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF THE

OFFICERS - Mellott v. Heemer, 161 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1998).
Bonnie and Wilkie Mellott owned land in Pennsylvania on which
they lived and operated a dairy farm. See Mellott v. Heemer, 161 F.3d
117, 119 (3d Cir. 1998). In 1989, the Mellotts filed for bankruptcy
and three years later their property was purchased at a public auction. The bankruptcy court directed the Mellotts to vacate the premises by December 10, 1992. Following three orders from the bankruptcy court directing the Mellotts to abandon the property, they
refused. Deputy marshals from the United States Marshal Service
posted notices at the Mellott's home on December 31, 1992, ordering them to remove themselves and their possessions from the premises by January 5, 1993. Their son Kirk, who also lived on the property in a separate house, found a similar notice on his door that same
day. Kirk admitted that he understood the notice as one ordering
him to vacate the premises.
The Mellotts continued to refuse to abandon the premises. On
January 11, 1993, the bankruptcy court ordered the United States
Marshal Service to secure the land and remove all individuals from
the premises. Deputy Marshal Don Heemer and five additional deputy marshals who were assigned to remove the Mellotts were provided
with the following information before the eviction: a county supervisor from the Farmers Home Administration reported that Wilkie
Mellott chased him off the Mellott property with a pick up truck, displayed a handgun after he drove the supervisor off the land, and
threatened to shoot at any federal agent who stepped on his property. See id. at 119-20. The county supervisor stated that he believed
his life had been endangered by the encounter. See id. at 120. Deputy Marshal Heemer also learned that the Mellotts supposedly owned
many firearms. See id. Further, Heemer learned that Kirk Mellott
was considered unstable subsequent to a head injury and that he had
previously told two other deputy marshals that his family would not
vacate their property.
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On January 21, 1993, the marshals, along with two state troopers, proceeded to the Mellott residence. The marshals wore bulletproof vests and were authorized to utilize a short shotgun and a semiautomatic rifle during the eviction procedure due to concerns that
they would face armed resistance from the Mellotts. When the marshals knocked on the front door, Bonnie Mellott opened the door
and Deputy Marshal Heemer entered the home, aimed his gun at
Bonnie's face, and shoved her into a chair. Heemer kept the gun
pointed at Bonnie for the duration of the eviction. Deputy Marshal
David Seich walked in next, pointed his shotgun at Wilkie Mellott,
and told him to remain still and keep quiet. The evidence demonstrated that prior to the eviction, the marshals knew that Wilkie was
recuperating from heart surgery. Following Seich, two additional
marshals and a state trooper entered the Mellott home.
Also on the premises during this encounter were Jackie Wright,
a Mellott family friend, and Michelle Hollinshead, a radio reporter.
Wright was present in the room with Bonnie and Wilkie when the
marshals entered the premises. At the time, Hollinshead was speaking with the local sheriff on a telephone in the kitchen. According to
Hollinshead, one of the marshals speedily entered the kitchen, put
his semi-automatic gun in Hollinshead's face and demanded that she
hang up the phone. When Hollinshead refused, the marshal placed
his gun "'to the back of her head' and told her to '[s]hut the hell up
and hang up the phone."' Id. (citations omitted). Hollinshead complied and the marshal, with his gun to Hollinshead's back, shoved
her toward the room where the others were being held.
Meanwhile, Wilkie Mellott said he did not feel well and asked
for his medicine. See id. at 120-21. When Bonnie attempted to retrieve it, Deputy Marshal Heemer forced her back in her chair and
asked where the medicine was kept. Heemer then retrieved the
medicine and handed it to Wilkie. See id. at 121.
At some point, Bonnie overheard the marshals discussing their
plans to get Kirk Mellott from his home on the property and she offered to go with them. The marshals refused her offer but stated instead that Wright could accompany them. Before the marshals left
for Kirk's house they ordered Bonnie and Wilkie off the property
and Deputy Marshal Heemer allegedly advised them to drive away or
they would be shot.
After Bonnie and Wilkie vacated the premises, the marshals
went to Kirk's home. Wright accompanied them in his own vehicle.
Upon arriving at Kirk's home, the marshals informed Wright that he
would enter the home ahead of the marshals. One marshal informed
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Wright "'that if anything goes wrong... you're going to be the first
one to go down."' Id. (citation omitted). As they proceeded into the
home, Wright felt a gun pointed in his back. Without knocking,
Wright entered and found Kirk sitting in the living room holding a
bag of his belongings. Deputy Marshal Heemer confronted Kirk,
pointed his gun at Kirk's chest, grabbed his arm, and "'spun him
around and pushed him up against the wall."' Id. (citation omitted).
Following a search of Kirk's bag and a sweep of the home, the marshals ordered Kirk and Wright off the property.
The plaintiffs, Bonnie, Wilkie, and Kirk Mellott, Michele Hollinshead, and Jackie Wright, filed suit in federal district court in Pennsylvania and alleged that the marshals violated their right under the
Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizures, and their
substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. See id.
Claiming an entitlement to qualified immunity, the marshals moved
for summaryjudgment. See id.
The district court denied the summary judgment motion. See id.
According to the district court, material issues of fact existed as to
whether the marshals infringed upon the plaintiffs' rights under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments by exercising excessive force while
evicting the Mellotts, and whether it was reasonable for the marshals
to believe that their behavior did not offend clearly established law.
See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court. See id. The court noted that the marshals
are entitled to qualified immunity if, at the time they acted, it was
reasonable for them to believe that their actions did not violate
clearly established constitutional rights enjoyed by the plaintiffs. See
id. In view of this standard, the court found that the marshals had
acted in an objectively reasonable manner when they evicted the Mellotts and further concluded that Wright was not seized for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 123, 125. Therefore, the Court
held that the plaintiffs had failed to show any violation of a constitutionally protected right that would prohibit the marshals from enjoying qualified immunity. See id. at 121.
Writing for the majority, Judge Alito began by noting that all of
the plaintiffs' claims must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. See id. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, Judge Alito
stated that all claims involving law enforcement officers who have allegedly used excessive force in the seizure of a free person are to be
examined under the Fourth Amendment and its accompanying
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"reasonableness" standard, rather than substantive due process. See
id.
In order to succeed on an excessive force claim, Judge Alito asserted that a plaintiff must show that the use of force by a defendant
was not objectively reasonable. See id. at 122. Applying this standard,
the judge indicated, required that attention be directed to the circumstances and facts of each case, including "'the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."' Id. (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Also important to this analysis,
Judge Alito added, is the number of people the officers confront and
whether the physical force used led to any injury. See id. In balancing these considerations, the court advised that the reasonableness of
the use of force must be assessed from the viewpoint of a reasonable
officer at the scene, who often has to make immediate judgments
under tense and uncertain conditions. See id.
The court next recounted Sharrarv. Felsing, in which the court
held that the conduct of twenty law enforcement officers who made
four suspects in a violent crime lay face-down on the ground and allegedly held guns to their heads and threatened. to "'blow [their]
brains out"' should they move, was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See id. (quoting Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 816,
821 (3d Cir. 1997)). Judge Alito, noting that the Sharrarcourt found
the official conduct extreme, mentioned the marshals' position that
their conduct cannot be found unlawful due to the fact that the Mellott's claims of force are minimal when compared to the allegations
of force in Sharrarthat were constitutionally permissible. See id. The
judge noted, however, that mere comparison between the Mellott's
case and Sharraris not enough to reach the court's reasonableness
determination. See id. Such a determination, the court asserted,
must hinge on particular facts and circumstances that the marshals
faced in this case. See id.
Turning to the "severity of the crime" element of Graham,Judge
Alito explained that the marshals were not sent to the Mellott home
to arrest them for committing a violent crime, but to remove them
from their formerly owned property. See id. Furthermore, the court
acknowledged that there was no evidence of any active resistance
throughout the eviction, but the court did observe that Hollinshead's
refusal to hang up the phone after the first request was a factor that
weighed in the marshals' favor in regard to their conduct subsequent
to her refusal. See id. at 123 n.4. Continuing, the court concluded
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that the Graham factor pertaining to the threat to an officer or individual's safety was significant in the court's determination that the
marshals' alleged conduct throughout the eviction was objectively
reasonable. See id. at 122-23.
Judge Alito related the warnings the marshals had been given
prior to the eviction: that Wilkie had threatened to shoot at any federal agent stepping on his land, that Wilkie reportedly owned a number of firearms and chased the county supervisor off his land with a
truck, and that Kirk was viewed as mentally unstable. See id. at 123.
In view of such admonitions, Judge Alito concluded that the marshals
had good reason to anticipate an armed confrontation and, therefore, in light of their own safety, it was objectively reasonable for
them to load and aim their guns. See id. Emphasizing the need to
consider the tense and uncertain conditions officers face when they
act, the court drew attention to the fact that the marshals, upon entering the Mellott home, not only encountered Bonnie and Wilkie,
butJackie Wright, who was unidentified at the time. See id. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the marshals heard an unknown
voice (Hollinshead) in another room and had no way of knowing to
whom she was speaking. See id. Judge Alito suggested that the marshals could reasonably have feared that Hollinshead was contacting a
cohort of the Mellotts and further hinted at the importance of Kirk
Mellott's absence. See id. The court also contrasted the fact that in
Sharrar twenty officers were present to deal with only four people
found in one location, whereas in the present case there were fewer
than ten officers present to confront five individuals, not all of whom
were encountered at the same spot at the same time. See id.
Continuing with the factor of whether the official force led to
physical injury, the court acknowledged that Wilkie had chest pains
but that the marshals provided him with his medication and that
there were no further complications. See id. Moreover, Judge Alito
indicated that there was no evidence of any physical injury to Bonnie
Mellott on the two occasions when the marshals pushed her into a
chair. See id. In light of all these factors, the court concluded that
the force applied by the marshals was objectively reasonable. See id.
Next, Judge Alito briefly addressed arguments raised by the dissenting opinion. See id. The judge dismissed the contention that the
present case was similar to Baker v. Monroe Township, in which officers
violated the Fourth Amendment when they pointed guns at and
handcuffed a woman and her three children upon their visit to a
home that was the subject of a police raid. See id. (citing Baker v.
Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186 (3d Cir. 1995)) The court explained
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that Baker, unlike the Mellott eviction, was devoid, of any evidence
that would suggest to the officers that force was necessary. See id. at
123-24. Continuing, the court bluntly asserted that its job in Mellott
was to apply constitutional standards, rather than norms of appropriateness when observing Deputy Marshal Heemer's admission that his
aiming a gun at an unarmed individual was inappropriate behavior.
See id. at 124 (citing Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994)).
Next, Judge Alito noted that the marshals were reasonable in fearing
for their safety, even though they entered into a rather peaceful
scene, because they might have thought that there were weapons
concealed in the living room that the suspects could retrieve. See id.
Further, Judge Alito opined that even if Wilkie Mellott had assured
the marshals that all firearms had been removed from the premises,
an officer concerned for his own safety could have been reasonably
skeptical. See id.
Finally, the court addressed Jackie Wright's claim. See id. The
court recounted Wright's allegation that the marshals infringed upon
his constitutional rights when they used him as an unwilling "human
shield" to enter Kirk Mellott's house. See id. The court rejected this
claim, finding that Wright had not been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. See id. Such a seizure only occurs, the court reported, when "'in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."' Id. (quoting California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. 621, 627-28
(1991)). Judge Alito observed that the marshals did not restrict
Wright's freedom when he accompanied them to retrieve Kirk because Wright volunteered to accompany the marshals. See id. In order to succeed on summary judgment, the court indicated that
Wright would have had to highlight some evidence demonstrating
that he had changed his mind and chose not to accompany the marshals to retrieve Kirk and that the marshals then compelled him to do
so. See id. at 124-25. The court noted that no evidence had been presented to establish that Wright asked to leave or stay outside Kirk's
home or that the marshals themselves told Wright that he could not
leave or remain outside. See id. at 125. Furthermore, the court stated
that the alleged statement of the marshal telling Wright that he was
going to enter the house first and that Wright felt a firearm in his
back were not sufficient to impart to a reasonable person in a similar
position that he was not allowed to leave. See id. The court suggested
it was likely that a person voluntarily entering a home before officers
with drawn guns, would feel a weapon on his back. See id.
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Having concluded that no Fourth Amendment seizure of Wright
had occurred, Judge Alito added that even if a seizure had occurred,
the marshals would still enjoy qualified immunity. See id. In reaching
this conclusion, the court explained that reasonable law enforcement
officers in the marshals' position could easily conclude that a reasonable person in Wright's circumstances would not believe that his
freedom was restricted. See id.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Rendell announced that the reasonableness of the marshals' behavior during the eviction is a jury
question. See id. (Rendell, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the
majority for ignoring the Third Circuit's most recent Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence articulated in Baker v. Monroe Township.
See id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The Baker court, Judge Rendell explained, concluded that a Fourth
Amendment violation could have been found based on testimony
demonstrating that prior to a drug raid police stopped three people
visiting the subject home, ordered them to lie on the ground, handcuffed them, drew their guns, and detained them for fifteen to
twenty-five minutes. See id. at 126 (Rendell, J., dissenting). Judge
Rendell noted that the police in Baker had encountered a benign
scene of individuals visiting family and, thus, there was nothing to
prompt the officers to apply the force allegedly used. See id.
The dissent argued that Baker was similar to the Mellott's case.
See id. Judge Rendell called attention to the admission by the police
in Baker that handcuffing the persons involved was inappropriate until they were under arrest. See id. Similarly, Judge Rendell noted that
in the present matter, Deputy Marshal Heemer admitted that aiming
a gun at an unarmed person was similarly inappropriate. See id. According to the judge, the marshals came upon a peaceful scene, there
was no indication of any resistance by the Mellotts, and there was no
evidence to suggest that the marshals needed to execute the force allegedly used. See id.
The dissent further opined that a jury could conclude that the
chances of violence toward the marshals were minor since only one
witness (the county supervisor) had witnessed any aggression exhibited by the Mellotts. See id. Related to this point, Judge Rendell illuminated some facts that he believed could color a fact finder's perception of the context of the case. See id. The judge observed that
the marshals were aware that, at the time of the eviction, the Mellotts
were in the process of suing the Farmers Home Administration and,
thus, trying the patience of federal agencies. See id. Moreover, the
judge mentioned that testimony from Bonnie Mellott noted that the
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bankruptcy court judge stated that he intended to "'make an example' of them." Id. at 126 n.1 (Rendell,J., dissenting).
Continuing, Judge Rendell noted that any fear the officers
might have had upon arriving at the Mellott home should have dissipated when they encountered a "pastoral scene" of people sitting silently in a living room and the officers should have "adjust[ed] their
response" accordingly. See id. at 126 (Rendell, J., dissenting). Further, the judge explained that Deputy Marshal Heemer testified that
Wilkie assured the marshals that no one else was present in the home
and that all weapons had been removed from the premises. See id.
Thus, Judge Rendell concluded that a jury may not have clearly determined that the force executed by the marshals from that point was
objectively reasonable. See id. Additionally, the judge maintained
that Wilkie Mellott could have had a seizure during the exhibition of
force. See id.
Finally, the dissent, as the majority had, referred to Sharrar,
which bordered on a Fourth Amendment violation when the police
exhibited "Rambo-type" behavior in rounding up violent crime suspects. See id. at 126-27 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (citing Sharrar, 128
F.3d at 822). Judge Rendell then maintained that the Mellott's case
also bordered on a Fourth Amendment violation, if not actually constituting a violation itself, because marshals were executing a civil
eviction but utilized tactics the dissent branded as "Gestapo-like." See
id. at 127 (Rendell, J., dissenting). In view of these considerations,
Judge Rendell urged that the majority acknowledge that genuine issues of fact regarding the reasonableness of the marshal's conduct
existed. See id.
The Mellott case is an excellent illustration of the difficulties of
balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the constitutional right to be free of unreasonable seizures. The Mellott case
could be a rallying point for defenders of aggressive police conduct
under the guise of officer safety, as well as for those who decry many
law enforcement officers as disdainful of personal liberty. Because
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allows for varying interpretations
of the reasonableness of police conduct, ajury could have differed as
to the degree of reasonableness of the marshals' conduct. In light of
the warnings given to the marshals prior to the eviction, however, the
Court of Appeals correctly determined that the official conduct was
objectively reasonable.
What is striking about the majority's opinion is the implicit acknowledgment that there exists a difference between appropriateness
and reasonableness. The court quickly dismissed Deputy Marshal
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Heemer's admission that his pointing a gun at an unarmed person
was inappropriate. It is possible, however, that if an officer admits
the conduct to be inappropriate, a reasonable trier of fact may view
the behavior as objectively unreasonable. The court most likely
chose not to explore such a distinction because of its recognition of
the difficulty police have in making immediate decisions in scenarios
with potentially dangerous variables. Thus, even in view of Heemer's
admission, Judge Alito looked to the reasonableness of the entire
course of conduct rather than focusing on one particular act or omission by the marshals. The majority decision appears to reflect a policy judgment giving police officers extreme deference.
The judgment of the court was reasonable given the course of
conduct of the Mellotts, as the marshals understood (i.e., chasing officers off their property and threatening to shoot at federal agents),
and the frame of mind of the marshals at the time of the eviction.
Further, even if in hindsight an officer concedes that one act was inappropriate, deference should be given to the intense and evolving
circumstances confronting the officers.
Judge Rendell's dissent suggests that once Wilkie Mellott assured
Heemer that the firearms had been removed from the property, the
resulting force applied by the marshals cannot clearly be viewed as
objectively reasonable. Such a suggestion cannot withstand earnest
evaluation. The dissenting judge does not explain why the officers
should have had any good faith reason to accept Wilkie's assertions
when the Mellotts themselves failed to respect a succession of court
orders demanding their extrication from the property. It strains
logic to urge acceptance of a proposition that firearms have been
removed from the property when the crux of the case is that the very
man making the statement refuses to remove himself and his belongings from the property.
Mellott should be seen as a very narrow holding since the Third
Circuit affirmed its commitment to evaluate Fourth Amendment matters on the elements and conditions of each particular case. Because
of the adherence to this approach, Mellott should not be misinterpreted as ajustification for excessive police force in other routine law
enforcement operations.
PatrickMcCormack

LABOR LAW -

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - AN UNTIMELY MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION, ADDRESSED TO A UNION'S ADMINISTRATIVE
BODY, DOES NOT TOLL THE SIX-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT -

Williams v. Chrysler, No. 98-7108, 1998 WL 871026 (3d Cir. Dec. 16,
1998).
On June 23, 1987, Charles Williams was employed by Chrysler
Corporation (Chrysler) as an assembly worker at the Newark, Delaware assembly plant when Chrysler terminated him for excessive absenteeism. See Williams v. Chrysler, No. 98-7108, 1998 WL 871026, at
*1 (3d Cir. Dec. 16, 1998). Chrysler maintained that it terminated
Williams in accordance with the Chronic Absentee Procedure, incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement between Chrysler and
Williams's labor union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (Union). The Chronic Absentee Procedure, however, excluded certain illnesses that were not to
be considered in calculating an employee's absentee rate. Williams
argued that his absenteeism was due to excludable illnesses and, thus,
his termination violated the collective bargaining agreement. Williams requested that the Union begin grievance procedures on his
behalf. Despite conducting many of the grievance processes, the Union withdrew the grievance on June 30, 1988, and refused to arbitrate
the termination issue based upon a finding that the grievance lacked
merit.
The Union's constitution outlined the proper appeal procedures Williams could commence to challenge the withdrawal of his
grievance. Specifically, Williams was required to appeal the withdrawal of his grievance internally before he could sue the Union in
federal court. Following the proper procedure, Williams appealed
the withdrawal of his grievance to the Union's public review board,
which rejected the appeal on January 9, 1996. See id. On April 26,
1996, Williams filed a motion for reconsideration based on his belief
that the review board had misinterpreted the guidelines, as well as
the illnesses from which he suffered. See id. at *2. On August 21,
1996, the review board denied the motion for reconsideration, noting that the motion was untimely and lacked merit. See id.
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On February 19, 1997, Williams sued Chrysler and the Union
under both federal and state law in the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware. See id. First, Williams alleged that both
Chrysler and the Union violated section 301 of the Labor Relations
Management Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). See id. Williams
alleged that in terminating him, Chrysler violated the collective bargaining agreement. See id. Williams further alleged that the Union
violated its own duty of fair representation by withdrawing his grievance against Chrysler. See id. Next, Williams asserted that both
Chrysler and the Union had breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing under Delaware state contract law. See id. Finally, Williams alleged that Chrysler violated section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1140 (1994) because Chrysler terminated Williams in an attempt to
deprive him of heath insurance and disability benefits. See id.
The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary
judgment on both the federal and state law claims, ruling that Williams's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. See id. Regarding the section 301 claim, the district court held that the claim
ripened subsequent to the review board's initial rejection of Williams's appeal on January 9, 1996. See id. Further, the district court
noted that the Union's constitution did not require Williams to request reconsideration of the review board's decision to exhaust his
administrative remedies. See id. Thus, according to the district court,
Williams's motion for reconsideration "could not toll the six-month
statute of limitations applied to section 301 claims." Id. The district
court concluded that Williams's section 301 claim was time-barred
due to his failure to file suit within six months from the Union review
board'sJanuary 9, 1996, rejection of his appeal. See id.
The district court addressed the ERISA and state contract law
claim together and found that Williams could have commenced both
claims when Chrysler terminated him on June 23, 1987. See id. The
district court relied upon precedent in determining that a three-year
statute of limitations was applicable to both claims and that Williams's claims were time barred. See id. Williams subsequently appealed the order granting summary judgment on all claims. See id.
In affirming the district court's summary judgment order, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "an
untimely motion for reconsideration pursuant to a union internal
appeal procedure cannot toll the six-month statute of limitations"
under section 301 of the LMRA. Id. at *4.
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Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Greenberg posited that a
court of appeals may conduct a plenary review of a district court's
granting of a summary judgment motion. See id. at *3. Further, the
appellate court noted that as a matter of law, a court should grant a
moving party's motion for summary judgment only when no genuine
issue of material fact exists. See id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)).
Elaborating on the summary judgment standard, Judge Greenberg
explained that a court should not grant a summary judgment motion
where, based upon the evidence, a reasonable jury could find in favor
of the non-moving party after all reasonable inferences are drawn in
favor of the non-moving party. See id. (citing Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91
F.3d 573, 577 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Noting that Williams's claims against Chrysler and the Union
were "a hybrid action" under section 301 of the LMRA, the court affirmed the district court's application of a six-month statute of limitations to the section 301 claim. See id. (citing DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983)). Judge Greenberg
recognized that the appellate court was bound by the review board's
finding that Williams's reconsideration motion was untimely. See id.
Because the parties agreed that the statute of limitations was six
months, the only question remaining was from what point in time the
claim actually accrued. See id. Thus, the judge observed that the
"determinative question... [was] whether untimely requests for reconsideration toll the statute [of limitations]." Id. The judge declared that the review board's finding was correct based upon an express reading of its rules that provide a thirty-day time limitation for a
party to file a request for reconsideration of a review board's decision. See id.
The court held that the six-month statute of limitations applicable to a section 301 claim could not be tolled by an untimely motion
for reconsideration. See id. at *4. The court observed that a ruling
declaring that an untimely request tolls the statute of limitations period allows for indefinite delays in seeking reconsideration. See id.
Recognizing that Williams was not intentionally late in filing his motion for reconsideration, the judge opined that allowing Williams's
claims to toll the statute of limitations for seven months would only
invite late filings of motions for reconsideration. See id.
Next, the court addressed Williams's argument that the review
board's failure immediately to reject his motion led him to believe
that his motion had been taken under consideration within the sixmonth time limit. See id. The court explained that Williams believed
Chrysler and the Union were estopped from asserting that the statute
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of limitations was not tolled based upon his untimely motion for reconsideration. See id. In finding Williams's estoppel argument
"unpersuasive," Judge Greenberg stated that "' [i] t would hardly be
sensible to say that [a body] can genuinely deny reconsideration only
when it gives the matter no thought ...

."'

Id. (quoting Interstate

Commerce Comm'n v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'r, 482 U.S. 270, 281
(1987)). The court further refuted Williams's estoppel argument because, assuming the estoppel claim was meritorious, Williams failed
to argue it at the district court level and thereby waived his right to
assert such argument on appeal. See id. Finding that Williams failed
to commence his section 301 claim within the six-month time period,
the judge concluded that the claim was time-barred. See id.
Finally, the court addressed Williams's ERISA and state contract
law claims. See id. Responding to Williams's concession at oral argument that the success of the ERISA and contract claims relied
upon a successful section 301 claim, the court summarily rejected
both the ERISA and contract claims because of the negative disposition of his section 301 claim. See id. Judge Greenberg noted that because the failed section 301 claim precluded Williams from bringing
either the ERISA or state contract law claims, the court would not
address the issue as to whether either of these claims were timebarred. See id. The court thus upheld the district court's granting of
the summary judgment motions on all claims. See id. at *5.
The Third Circuit's conclusion that an untimely motion for reconsideration cannot toll the six-month statute of limitations applicable to section 301 claims was the correct decision. Definite and
uniformly applied statutes of limitations on causes of action and appeals are necessary in order to ensure timely adjudication of claims.
Not only does the timely adjudication of claims ensure fairness to a
defendant, it empowers a plaintiff to bring suit supported by readily
available evidence and witnesses that might not otherwise be available if a long time period lapses from the time a claim ripened. In
furtherance of the need for clarity in application of statutes of limitations, the holding in Williams provides a clear and unambiguous
standard that plaintiffs bringing section 301 claims may utilize in determining when they must appeal a decision of a union review board.
John Davidson MillerIII

